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Abstract
The experiences of people living with HIV have been transformed over recent years. Advances
in medical science have made the virus a manageable chronic condition, while eliminating the
risk of onward transmission for those with access to treatment, something referred to as TasP
(treatment as prevention) or U¼U (undetectable equals untransmissible). More recently, the
availability of PrEP (pre-exposure prophylaxis), alongside PEP (post-exposure prophylaxis),
through the NHS has created the conditions for condomless sexual encounters to take place
without the fear of HIV transmission associated with previous decades. Despite this, the
criminal law has continued to frame HIV in terms of personal responsibility and bodily
autonomy within the dominant narratives of danger, disease, and out-dated science. Doctrinal
law has failed to keep pace with social and scientific change. Therefore, in this article, we
provide a re-examination of the criminal issues relating to HIV transmission within this new
landscape, arguing that it necessitates a shift in attitude, policy and doctrine. We specifically
argue that HIV transmission does not meet the appropriate harm threshold to constitute GBH
and that if criminal law is ultimately about preventing or regulating harm, the ongoing crim-
inalisation of HIV transmission is counter to that aim.
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It is during another global pandemic—that of COVID-191—that the UK Government has announced signif-
icant changes to the availability of HIV pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP)2 in England,3 moving from limited
availability via ‘trials’,4 to routine availability for the general population via the National Health Service
(NHS).5–7 As the search for effective responses (e.g. vaccines) to one pandemic continues to be the focus of
policymakers and scientists, PrEP has become more widely available in efforts to prevent new HIV diagnoses.
This sits alongside pre-exposure prophylaxis (PEP)8 and treatment as prevention (TasP)9 as an important
pharmaceutical tool which has the potential to halt the transmission of HIV.
The move to make PrEP available on the NHS has the power not only to transform the statistics on HIV
transmission in England and Wales but also to re-shape the criminal law pertaining to HIV transmission.10
Such developments arguably have applicability for healthcare and legal systems well beyond the UK as
governments and NGOs seek to utilise law to shape behaviours, manage decision-making and risk-taking.
1. The World Health Organization defines COVID-19 as ‘the infectious disease caused by the most recently discovered cor-
onavirus. This new virus and disease were unknown before the outbreak began in Wuhan, China, in December 2019. COVID-
19 is now a pandemic affecting many countries globally’. See ‘Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)’ Who.int (2020) <https://
www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/question-and-answers-hub/q-a-detail/q-a-coronaviruses> acces-
sed 28 October 2020.
2. The PrEP campaign group Prepster describes the treatment as: ‘a way of preventing HIV infection by taking a pill on an
ongoing basis before sex and continued after sex. It’s taken by someone who doesn’t have HIV, to prevent them from getting
HIV. The PrEP pill is an antiretroviral drug—the same type of pill taken by someone who already has HIV to treat HIV’. See
‘Prepster’ Prepster (2020) <https://prepster.info> accessed 28 October 2020.
3. Availability was confirmed in Wales in June 2020. See Reiss Smith, ‘HIV Activists Celebrate as Wales Confirms Life-Saving
HIV Drug PrEP Will Be Rolled Out on the NHS’ PinkNews—Gay News, Reviews and Comment from the World’s Most Read
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Trans News Service (2020) <https://www.pinknews.co.uk/2020/06/30/prep-wales-roll-out-com
missioned-available-hiv-drug/> accessed 28 October 2020.
4. Local authorities are the responsible commissioner for HIV prevention services in England under reg 6 of the Local
Authorities (Public Health Functions and Entry to Premises by Local Healthwatch Representatives) Regulations 2013.
5. See ‘HIV Prevention Drug PrEP “To Be Made Available on the NHS This Year”‘ The Telegraph (2020) <https://www.tel
egraph.co.uk/news/2020/03/15/hiv-prevention-drug-made-available-nhs-year/> accessed 28 October 2020.
6. The March announcement on PrEP was followed by some confusion about a potential step back from this position but it
became clear that the rollout would be slightly delayed by Covid-19 but would still happen. See Jamie Wareham, ‘Life-Saving
HIV Drug PrEP on NHS Delayed amid Coronavirus Pandemic’ Forbes (2020) <https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamiewareham/
2020/06/05/life-saving-hiv-drug-prep-on-nhs–indefinitely-delayed-amid-coronavirus-pandemic/#3e3080f91416> accessed
28 October 2020.
7. On the legal battle to get to this point, see Alexander Maine, ‘Bareback Sex, PrEP, National AIDS Trust v NHS England and
the Reality of Gay Sex’ (2020) 23(8) Sexualities 1362.
8. Post-exposure prophylaxis is an anti-viral treatment that can be taken after someone believes they have been exposed to a risk
of HIV transmission. See ‘Is Prep Different From PEP?—Prepster’ Prepster.info (2020) <https://prepster.info/ser(vices/ser
vice-2/> accessed 28 October 2020.
9. This refers to the use of antiviral treatment by someone who is HIV positive to stay healthy and to also reduce the risk of
transmitting HIV. See, generally, ‘Tasper! Find Out More About Treatment as Prevention! | Prepster’ Prepster (2020) <https://
prepster.info/tasp/> accessed 28 October 2020.
10. The focus of this article is on the law in England and Wales, but the criminalisation of HIV debate is global. Problematic tropes
of ‘the disease spreader’ intersect with issues of race, class and shame. See Joey L Mogul, Andrea J Ritchie, and Kay Whitlock,
Queer (In)justice: The Criminalization of LGBT People in the United States (Beacon Press, Boston 2011) 34–36; Libby Adler,
Gay Priori: A Queer Critical Legal Studies Approach to Law Reform (Duke University Press, Durham 2018) 68. On global
legal responses to HIV more generally, see James Chalmers, Legal Responses to HIV and AIDS (Hart Publishing, Oxford
2008). The legal debate has not been limited to criminalisation, but also to healthcare rights, eg Alexandra Juhasz and
Theodore (Ted) Kerr, ‘Who Are the Stewards of the AIDS Archive? Sharing the Political Weight of the Intimate’ in Angela
Jones, Jospeh Nicholas DeFilippis and Michael W Yarbrough (eds), The Unfinished Queer Agenda After Marriage Equality
(Routledge, Abingdon 2018); Maine (n 7); Matthew Weait, ‘The Healthcare Rights of People Living with HIV and AIDS’ in
Chris Ashford and Alexander Maine (eds), Research Handbook on Gender, Sexuality and the Law (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham
2020).
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The law on HIV transmission has arguably lagged behind a seismic shift in clinical practice and medical
science, maintaining criminalisation under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (OAP).11 This has
contributed to moral judgments of those participating in what may be viewed as ‘high risk’ practices such
as bareback12 (condomless) sex.13 The interpretation of OAP as capturing HIV transmission14 has further
operated to re-code such practices—from expressions of desire to enactments of violence15—supporting
normative attitudes that such engagements are deviant or illegitimate.
Moreover, as Gonzalez has noted, society continues to be shaped by the original trauma of the HIV/AIDS
pandemic,16 especially for queer and other marginalised communities. During the early days of that crisis
there were many questions, few answers, and rumours took on a power of their own.17 In the 1980s and 1990s,
AIDS found a solution—of sorts—with condoms becoming a social and medical response, and thereby a
signifier for salvation, protection, and responsibility (terms which have been similarly applied to masks, social
distancing, and vaccines during the current crisis). This response was, in turn, codified by the criminal law as
responsibility acquired accountability. As such, the law acts as a site of trauma,18 one that is seemingly unable
to move into the ‘new normal’19 of PrEP, PEP, TasP and U¼U, alternatives to the condom-based discourse of
‘safe sex’.
Condomless sex is variously celebrated and condemned in Western contemporary cultures.20 On the
one hand, pregnancy—typically the result of condomless sexual encounters—can be reason for celebration,
a triumphant result of hetero- and homonormative ideals. The child can be a symbol for reproductive instinct,
the survival of humanity, our culture and our values. On the other hand, pregnancy without an identifiable
father, or outside the bounds of marriage, can still be cause for moral and social concern—perhaps less
prevalent but still imbued with classist and racist undertones. These tensions of normativity continue to be
regulated by the operation of civil law in this sphere.21
By comparison, the term ‘bareback’ possesses a range of nuanced and complex meanings, each with different
discursive dynamics, which have shifted over time.22 This is important for understanding how the law relating to
11. Law Commission, ‘Reform of Offences Against the Person’ (Law Com No 361 HMSO, London 2015) <https://s3-eu-west-
2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-storage-11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2015/11/51950-LC-HC555_Web.pdf> accessed 26 Octo-
ber 2020.
12. See, more generally, Michael Shernoff, Without Condoms: Unprotected Sex, Gay Men & Barebacking (Routledge, Abingdon
2006).
13. See Chris Ashford, ‘Bareback Sex, Queer Legal Theory, and Evolving Socio-Legal Contexts’ (2015) 18(1–2) Sexualities 195.
14. See, generally, Matthew Weait, Intimacy and Responsibility: The Criminalisation of HIV Transmission (Routledge-
Cavendish, Abingdon 2007).
15. See Chris Ashford, ‘Barebacking and the Cult of Violence: Queering the Criminal Law’ (2010) 74(4) J Crim L 339.
16. See, more generally, Paul Flynn, Good as You (Ebury Press, London 2017), especially ch 5. This historic trauma is not limited
to gay men. Lesbians were key in the struggle. See, also, Beth E Schnieider, ‘Lesbian Politics and AIDS Work’ in Ken
Plummer (ed), Modern Homosexualities: Fragments of Lesbian and Gay Experience (Routledge, London 1992).
17. See, eg, Dennis Altman, AIDS in the Mind of America: The Social, Political, and Psychological Impact of a New Epidemic
(Anchor Press/Doubleday, Garden City 1986); Eric Rofes, Reviving the Tribe: Regenerating Gay Men’s Sexuality and Culture
in the Ongoing Epidemic (Harrington Park Press, New York 1996).
18. HIV/AIDS has a particular place in queer history, not only through the criminalisation of HIV transmission but a broader
social agenda in which sexual health intersect with issues of homophobia and education, censorship and access to healthcare.
This was particularly notable in the US context and the 1987 ‘Helms Amendment’ to what would become Departments of
Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1988, and in the UK, s 28 of the
Local Government Act 1988. See, respectively, Lisa Duggan and Nan D Hunter, Sex Wars: Sexual Dissent and Political
Culture (Routledge, Abingdon 2006) 129–30, and Madeleine Colvin with Jane Hawksley, Section 28: A Practical Guide to the
Law and its Implications (Liberty, Chennai 1989).
19. Gonzalez, ‘HIV Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP), “The Truvada Whore,” and the New Gay Sexual Revolution’ in Ricky
Varghese (ed), Raw: PrEP, Pedagogy, and the Politics of Barebacking (University of Regina Press, Regina 2019) 34.
20. See, more generally, Tim Dean, Unlimited Intimacy: Reflection on the Subculture of Barebacking (University of Chicago
Press, Chicago 2009).
21. See, generally, Dean Spade, Normal Life: Administrative Violence, Critical Trans Politics, & the Limits of Law’ (Duke
University Press, Durham and London 2015) 50–73.
22. Adam Greteman, ‘Viral Matters: Barebacking and PrEP’ in Adam Greteman (ed), Sexualities and Genders in Education:
Towards Queer Thriving (Palgrave Macmillan, Cham 2018).
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HIV transmission takes on a broader power in relation to bareback sex. As Dean has noted, sex without condoms
was once simply ‘natural’, for there was no alternative. Bareback sex was simply sex. Yet today the term can be
understood in a number of forms, as the ‘outcome of highly specific cultural processes of eroticization’.23 That is
to say, the fetishisation of bareback through pornographic labels and broader (sub)culture through websites, sex
parties, and other interactions (sometimes intersecting with the phenomenon of chemsex)24 has served to
transform the act of bareback sex into one with broader cultural characteristics for many; it must be understood
beyond merely the narrow normative construction of condomless sex that the criminal law has assumed.
Condomless anal sex remains a controversial subject, even in queer cultures. Mainstream and community-
based media often reminds us that bareback is ‘bad’, and this moral policing is increasingly backed by legal
interventions globally which seek to address the transmission of sexual infections, alongside regulatory regimes
to control and censure visual depictions of bareback sex. This framework sees the barebacking sexual citizen25
forge new visions of what it is to be a homosexual in the 21st century, challenging narratives that have often been
associated with equality and normative agendas (e.g. marriage, monogamy, and military participation).26 More-
over, while scholars have begun to understand this phenomenon through theoretical constructions of the homo-
normative and ‘good gay, bad queer’ analysis,27 this article seeks to theorise and discuss how scientific and
social developments might produce legal shifts which re-shape our understanding(s) and construction(s) of HIV
as they relate to the criminal law.
The article re-considers the law relating to HIV transmission and, in contrast with other accounts of this area,
seeks to understand it within a new scientific context and people’s lived experiences of sexuality. Drawing on
this framework, we argue that risk and harm must be re-evaluated when considering the law pertaining to HIV.28
This is particularly acute in relation to the classification of the transmission of HIV as grievous bodily harm
(GBH), as we argue that HIV transmission does not meet the appropriate harm threshold.29 This article develops
over three parts. Firstly, we explore recent scientific research about the effectiveness of TasP and the use of PrEP
for preventing the transmission of HIV. Secondly, we explore the relevant law, to understand how and why the
transmission of HIV has been criminalised. In doing this, we offer reflections on why some HIV charities and
other groups have endorsed the criminalisation of transmission. Lastly, we explore how harm has been con-
ceptualised in legal, medical, and societal terms. By analysing these different notions of ‘harm’, we argue that
HIV no longer attains the severity required to constitute GBH, and that—by being unaware of the harms which
criminalisation itself perpetuates, through stigma and trauma—the criminal law (as it stands) undermines core
aspects of the liberal case in favour of legally regulating consenting sexual behaviours.
Part One: HIV Treatment and Prevention
Before the development of ‘highly effective’ antiretroviral therapies (ART) in 1996 an HIV test signalled
serious health implications for almost anyone who tested positive.30 The effects of the virus on a person’s
23. Tim Dean, ‘Afterword: The Raw and the Fucked’, in Ricky Varghese (ed), Raw: PrEP, Pedagogy, and the Politics of
Barebacking (University of Regina Press, Regina 2019) 259.
24. This broader context can be understood within a broader ‘sluttiness’ or sleaze, also known as ‘pig’ behaviour. See, eg, João
Florêncio, Bareback Porn, Porous Masculinities, Queer Futures: The Ethics of Becoming-Pig (Routledge, Abingdon 2020).
Again, this also needs to be understood in the broader context of shame. See David M Halperin and Valerie Traub, Gay Shame
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2009).
25. See, generally, David Bell and Jon Binnie, The Sexual Citizen: Queer Politics and Beyond (Polity Press, Cambridge 2000).
26. See, eg, Michelangelo Signorile, It’s Not Over: Getting Beyond Tolerance, Defeating Homophobia, and Winning True Equality
(Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, Boston/New York 2015); Jeffrey Weeks, The World We Have Won (Routledge, Oxon 2007).
27. See, eg, Chris Ashford, ‘(Homo)normative Legal Discourses and the Queer Challenge’ (2011) 1(1) Durham L Rev 77; Lisa
Duggan, The Twilight of Equality? Neoliberalism, Cultural Politics, and the Attack on Democracy (Beacon Press, Boston
2003); Gayle S Rubin, Deviations (Duke University Press, Durham/London 2011) ch 5.
28. And, we would argue, the transmission of disease more generally.
29. A similar argument has begun to be advocated in the Australian context, see, eg, Thomas Poberezny-Lynch, ‘Criminalising
Infection: Questioning the Assumption that Transmitting HIV Constitutes Grievous Bodily Harm’ (2019) 44(2) Alt LJ 138.
30. ‘Why Can’t Current Drugs Cure HIV Infection?’ Tufts Now (2016) <https://now.tufts.edu/articles/why-can-t-current-drugs-
cure-hiv-infection> accessed 28 October 2020.
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immune system contributed to a constellation of opportunistic infections, cancers (Kaposi’s sarcoma), and
other life-threatening conditions collectively referred to as ‘AIDS’ (Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome).
However, as the efficacy and variety of medications available to treat HIV has increased, the virus has been
transformed ‘from an inexorably fatal disease to a chronic, manageable condition’ with few—if any—long
term physiological consequences.31 In countries such as England, where access to ART is available to most
through the NHS, research suggests that people living with HIV will have a ‘normal life expectancy’.32 If
diagnosed and treated early, some health organisations have even suggested that HIV positive people may live
longer than average due to the detailed and regular health checks they receive.33 In short, access to ART
means that those who test positive for HIV can expect long and healthy lives.34
Alongside improved health outcomes for positive people, a series of major studies have proved that being
on ART lowers the risk of HIV transmission so much that it has been described as ‘scientifically equivalent to
zero’.35 For example, the PARTNER study evidenced the preventative effectiveness of treatment by docu-
menting over 58,000 acts of condomless sex between 888 serodiscordant couples—where one partner was
positive and the other was negative36—across 14 European countries between September 2010 and May
2014.37 Focusing exclusively on ‘gay couples’, the PARTNER2 study replicated these results, documenting
over 77,000 acts of bareback sex between 783 couples between May 2014 and April 2018. These studies
followed a series of research projects with smaller samples38 including the Opposites Attract study (2017),
which also focused on men who have sex with men (MSM), and documented 12,000 acts of bareback sex
between 358 couples in Australia, Brazil and Thailand.39 To date, there has never been a recorded case of
someone transmitting HIV when their viral load is ‘undetectable’.
The term undetectable refers to the number of copies of the virus found in 1 millimetre of an HIV positive
person’s blood being below the threshold for detection (fewer than 20 copies in the most sensitive tests
available). Given the overwhelming body of medical evidence now available, health organisations around
the world—including the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institutes of Health, and
World Health Organization—have embraced the tagline ‘Undetectable equals Untransmittable’ (U¼U). In
2018, an ‘Expert Consensus Statement’ was published by leading HIV scientists, who further argued that
‘criminal law is sometimes applied in a manner inconsistent with contemporary medical and scientific
evidence: including overstating both the risk of HIV transmission and also the potential for harm to a person’s
health and wellbeing’.40 This new understanding of HIV ‘harm’ and ‘risk’—or lack thereof—has become a
31. Mauro Guarinieri and Lital Hollander, ‘From Denver to Dublin: The Role of Civil Society in HIV Treatment and Control’ in
Srdan Matic, Jeffery Lazarus and Martin Donoghoe (eds), HIV/AIDS in Europe: Moving from Death Sentence to Chronic
Disease Management (World Health Organization, Copenhagen 2006) 98.
32. Antiretroviral Therapy Cohort Collaboration, ‘Survival of HIV-Positive Patients Starting Antiretroviral Therapy between
1996 and 2013: A Collaborative Analysis of Cohort Studies’ (2017) 4(8) The Lancet HIV 349.
33. Simon Collins, ART in Pictures: HIV Treatment Explained (HIV I-Base, London 2017) 3.
34. Wei Xu and others, ‘Advancements in Developing Strategies for Sterilizing and Functional HIV Cures’ (2017) 2017 Biomed
Res Intl 1.
35. Gus Cairns, ‘Zero Transmissions Means Zero Risk—PARTNER 2 Study Results Announced’ aidsmap.com (2018) <http://
www.aidsmap.com/Zero-transmissions-mean-zero-risk-PARTNER-2-study-results-announced/page/3311249/> accessed 28
October 2020.
36. The idea of serodiscordant couples is another aspect of HIV discourse which has been rooted in narratives of shame and risk.
PrEP and TasP means that the risk of HIV transmission in serodiscordant couples is virtually non-existent. See Dion Kagan,
Positive Images: Gay Men & HIV/AIDS in the Culture of ‘Post-Crisis’ (IB Taurus, London 2018) 114–21.
37. Alison Rodger and others, ‘Risk of HIV Transmission through Condomless Sex in Serodifferent Gay Couples with the HIV-
Positive Partner Taking Suppressive Antiretroviral Therapy (PARTNER): Final Results of a Multicentre, Prospective,
Observational Study’ (2019) 393(10189) The Lancet 2428.
38. See, further, Simon Collins, ‘The Evidence for U¼U (Undetectable ¼ Untransmittable): Why Negligible Risk Is Zero Risk |
HTB | HIV I-Base’ I-base.info (2017) <https://i-base.info/htb/32308> accessed 27 October 2020.
39. ‘Effective HIV Treatment Halts HIV Transmission among Homosexual Couples, Study Finds | UNSW—The Kirby Institute
for Infection and Immunity in Society’ Kirby.unsw.edu.au (2017) <https://kirby.unsw.edu.au/news/effective-hiv-treatment-
halts-hiv-transmission-among-homosexual-couples-study-finds> accessed 27 October 2020.
40. Francoise Barre-Sinoussi and others, ‘Expert Consensus Statement on the Science of HIV in the Context of Criminal Law’
(2018) 21 J AIDS Soc 1, 2.
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powerful tool for reframing discussions of HIV among activists, academics, and policymakers.41 Therefore, in
this article, we suggest that the manner in which HIV is framed by UK criminal law is flawed, principally
because it overstates the harm that this virus causes in contexts where ART is accessible.
The Significance of PrEP
Given the efficacy of ART in making onward transmission of HIV an impossibility for positive people who get
tested and treated, another area of medical research has expanded to explore whether the same medications can be
used by negative people to prevent seroconversion. Much like Post-Exposure Prophylaxis (PEP)—treatment
which has been available to healthcare workers since 1997 and the general public since 200542—Pre-Exposure
Prophylaxis (PrEP) refers to HIV medications taken as a precautionary or preventative measure. While PEP is
recommended for use immediately after exposure (within 72 hours),43 PrEP can be taken as a daily regimen in case
of possible exposure to HIV. Both preventative treatments use medications which are the same as, and sometimes
identical to, those taken by positive people to suppress the virus. The first HIV medication approved for use as
PrEP was trademarked under the name Truvada, a combination of the drugs emtricitabine and tenofovir, although
generic versions are now also available.44
To date, there has only been one documented case of someone on PrEP acquiring a strain of HIV which
was not drug-resistant, where regular adherence has been adequately measured.45 Both the PROUD trial of
PrEP use among 544 MSM in England,46 and the IPERGAY trial of ‘on-demand’ or ‘event-based’ PrEP use
among 353 MSM in Canada and France, found treatment to be 86% effective.47 Halving the number of pills
taken on average, participants in the latter study were asked to take PrEP immediately (2 to 24 hours) before
bareback sex, and for the following two days, rather than daily.48 These studies demonstrated the efficacy of
PrEP when self-prescribed or taken on an irregular basis.
Although there is now clear evidence of ART as treatment/prevention reducing rates of HIV transmission,
it is difficult to discern the comparative success of each method. For example, the largest sexual health clinic
in London saw a 42% decrease in new HIV diagnoses between 2015 and 2016 (from 679 to 393), with little
difference in diagnoses of other sexually transmitted infections (STIs).49 However, it remains unknown whether
positive people taking ART or negative people taking PrEP contributed more to this unprecedented decline,
especially as the clinic was involved in both the PROUD study and had recently stepped up efforts to provide
HIV treatment immediately following diagnoses. Similarly, following an 18% decrease in new diagnoses the year
before, San Francisco saw a 17% decrease in new HIV diagnoses between 2014 and 2015 (from 309 to 255)—
shortly after Truvada was approved for use as PrEP, but before it had been widely adopted.50 One explanation for
41. ‘ZERO: No Linked HIV Transmissions in PARTNER Study after Couples Had Sex 58,000 Times without Condoms | HTB |
HIV I-Base’ I-base.info (2017) <http://i-base.info/htb/30108> accessed 5 July 2017.
42. Department of Health, Guidelines on Post-Exposure Prophylaxis for Health Care Workers Occupationally Exposed to HIV
(Department of Health, London 1997).
43. ‘Can Post-Exposure Prophylaxis (PEP) Stop Me Getting HIV?—Health Questions—NHS Choices’ Nhs.uk (2017) <http://
www.nhs.uk/chq/Pages/1840.aspx?CategoryID¼73> accessed 5 July 2017.
44. ‘PrEP—Love May Have Another Protector’ Men.PrEPfacts.org (2017) <http://men.PrEPfacts.org/the-basics/> accessed 5
July 2017.
45. Elske Hoornenborg and others, ‘Acquisition of Wild-Type HIV-1 Infection in a Patient on Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis with
High Intracellular Concentrations of Tenofovir Diphosphate: A Case Report’ (2017) 4 (11) The Lancet HIV e522.
46. Sheena McCormack and others, ‘Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis to Prevent the Acquisition of HIV-1 Infection (PROUD):
Effectiveness Results from the Pilot Phase of a Pragmatic Open-Label Randomised Trial’ (2016) 387(10013) The Lancet 53.
47. Jean-Michel Molina and others, ‘Efficacy, Safety, and Effect on Sexual Behaviour of On-Demand Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis
for HIV in Men Who Have Sex with Men: An Observational Cohort Study’ (2017) 4(9) The Lancet HIV e402
48. Jean-Michel Molina and others, ‘On-Demand Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis in Men at High Risk for HIV-1 Infection’ (2015) 373
N Engl J Med 2237.
49. ‘42% Drop in New HIV Diagnoses at 56 Dean Street in Just 12 Months—Chelsea and Westminster Hospital NHS Foundation
Trust’ Chelwest.nhs.uk (2017) <http://www.chelwest.nhs.uk/about-us/news/40-drop-in-new-hiv-diagnoses-at-56-dean-street-
in-just-12-months> accessed 26 October 2020.
50. San Francisco Department of Public Health, HIV Epidemiology Annual Report 2015 (HIV Epidemiology Section, 2016)
<https://www.sfdph.org/dph/comupg/oprograms/HIVepiSec/HIVepiSecReports.asp> accessed 28 October 2020.
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this decline in transmission may be that a significant number of MSM began purchasing generic versions of
Truvada online—using websites such as iwantprepnow.com—before these medications had been approved
officially. Whichever prevention method has been most responsible for reducing the rate of transmission, HIV
medications common to both explain this trend, given that there is no evidence of a decline in bareback sex
following their availability. Furthermore, the increased availability of PrEP in these studies found either no change
or more diagnoses of other STIs:
Incidence rate ratios showed that MSM using PrEP were 25.3 times more likely to acquire a Neisseria
gonorrhoeae infection, 11.2 times more likely to acquire a Chlamydia trachomatis infection, and 44.6 times
more likely to acquire a syphilis infection versus MSM not using PrEP.51
At face value, these numbers may appear concerning, but if the principle of testing as prevention is applied
(i.e. those who become aware of an infection can take additional measures, including treatment, to prevent its
onward transmission) then the distribution of PrEP combined with routine sexual health screening has been
modelled to suggested lower rates of transmission across the board.52
The research outlined in Part One demonstrates that HIV has changed considerably over the past decade,
even if there is a lag in cultural attitudes shaped by dominant discourses of law and medicine (see below). As
this suggests, a core component of successful public health strategies involves allowing people to routinely
monitor their sexual health and access ART. Furthermore, combining testing and treatment is more likely to
be achieved by the distribution of PrEP through official healthcare systems (such as the NHS), where
information and resources can be shared across the population. With a basic understanding of the epidemio-
logical evidence about HIV, it is clear that such medications have been effective at preventing or eliminating
transmission, making a health problem once perceived as an existential threat into something manageable and
survivable. In the following sections, we describe the social and legal implications these developments may
have as they become more widely known.
Part Two: HIV and the Criminal Law
Criminal statute in England and Wales does not explicitly address the subject of HIV transmission. None-
theless, the criminalisation of HIV transmission has become the subject of growing academic and policy
debate.53 Falling under the rubric of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, the criminal law has estab-
lished that HIV transmission can constitute an offence of GBH.54 The effect of this has been that, while some
instances of condomless sex are valorised (as noted above) others are legally and socially re-coded as acts of
violence.55
51. Noah Kojima, Joseph Davey Dvora and D Klausner Jeffrey, ‘Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis for HIV Infection and New Sexually
Transmitted Infections among Men Who Have Sex with Men’ (2016) 30(14) AIDS 2251, 2252.
52. See Jean-Michel Molina and others, ‘Post-Exposure Prophylaxis with Doxycycline to Prevent Sexually Transmitted Infections
in Men Who Have Sex with Men: An Open-Label Randomised Substudy of the ANRS IPERGAY Trial’ (2018) 18(3) The
Lancet: Infectious Diseases 308.
53. See, eg, Matthew Weait, ‘Criminal Law and the Sexual Transmission of HIV’ (2005) 68(1) MLR 121–34; Simon Cooper and
Alan Reed, ‘Informed Consent and the Transmission of Sexual Disease: Dadson Revivified’ (2007) 71(5) J Crim L 461; Udo
Schuklenk, ‘Should We Use the Criminal Law to Punish HIV Transmission’ (2008) 4(3) International Journal of Law in
Context 277; Law Commission, ‘Reform of Offences Against the Person: A Scoping Consultation Paper’ (Law Commission
2014); David Hughes, ‘Condom Use, Viral Load and the Type of Sexual Activity as Defences to Sexual Transmission of HIV’
(2013) 72(2) J Crim L 136; George Mawhinney, ‘To Be Ill or to Kill: The Criminality of Contagion’ (2013) 77(3) J Crim L
202; John Francis and Leslie Francis, ‘HIV Treatment as Prevention: Not an Argument for Continuing Criminalisation of HIV
Transmission’ (2013) 9(4) Int JLC 520; Samantha Ryan, ‘Disclosure and HIV Transmission’ (2015) 79(6) J Crim L 395;
Samantha Ryan, ‘ “Active Deception” v Non-Disclosure: HIV Transmission, Non-Fatal Offences and Criminal Responsi-
bility’ (2019) Crim LR 4.
54. It should be noted that other offences may be possible in certain circumstances. See, generally, Law Commission, ‘Reform of
Offences Against the Person’ (n 53).
55. Rubin (n 27).
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The placement of HIV transmission within the remit of GBH—or more generally Offences Against the
Person (OAP)—is telling of the law’s desire to disown its cultural and social effects; to deny its regulation of
what it regards as the pre-eminently personal sphere.56 Specifically, all cases of HIV transmission which have
been successfully prosecuted fell under either s 2057 or s 1858 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861,
rather than under an offence created by the Sexual Offences Act 2003 or its predecessors.59 In this sense, the
criminal law ignores the sexual nature of STIs, instead coding them simply as bodily harm.
The offence of GBH is the most serious non-fatal offence which can be charged under the laws of England
and Wales. GBH requires that the defendant ‘inflict grievous bodily harm’ either intentionally (s 18) or while
being subjectively reckless as to the risk of causing harm (s 20). Wilson has established that GBH does not
require an assault or battery to have been committed.60 Rather, it requires that the:
Accused has directly or violently inflicted it [the harm] by assaulting the victim or . . . [that] the accused has
‘inflicted’ it by doing something intentionally which though it is not in itself a direct application of force to
the body of the victim does result in some force being applied violently to the body of the victim so that he
suffers grievous bodily harm.61
Following the judgment in Burstow, ‘inflicting’ is synonymous with ‘causing’, meaning that all that is
required is for the defendant to have caused harm.62 It then requires that the victim suffer harm arising to
the level of GBH. Pivotally, the 2004 case of R v Dica63 decided that previous authority in the form or R v
Clarence64 should not prevent:
The successful prosecution of those who, knowing that they are suffering from HIV or some other serious
sexual disease, recklessly transmit it through consensual sexual intercourse, and inflict grievous bodily harm
on a person from whom the risk is concealed and who is not consenting to it.65
The result of this decision was that, since 2004, HIV transmission through consensual sex has been a ground
for criminal sanction. Finally, for GBH, it must be shown that the defendant intended harm (s 18)66 or was
reckless as to the risk of some harm (s 20), although this need not be the level of harm that in fact occurred.67
Indeed, it is only a requirement that the defendant was reckless to any level of harm occurring (see below for
further discussion of how ‘harm’ is defined). Consequently, a defendant who did not know their HIV status but
anticipated the possibility of harm (such as abrasions or bruises during sexual interaction) and unintentionally
transmitted HIV to their partner(s) could be liable under s 20.
56. It should be noted n stating this that English Common Law has traditionally recognised no distinct right to private life. See,
generally, R v Khan [1996] UKHL 14, [1997] AC 558. However, a right to privacy is provided under art 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR) art 8. Following the passing of the Human
Rights Act 1998, this right to privacy should be considered both when interpreting statutes and developing the common law.
57. R v Dica [2004] QB 1257 (CA); R v Konzani [2005] 2 Cr App R 14 (CA).
58. R v Rowe (Daryll) [2018] EWCA Crim 2688, [2019] 1 Cr App R (S) 38.
59. Indeed, in EB it was found that non-disclosure of HIV positive status did not undermine effective consent as defined by s 74 of
the Offences against the Sexual Offences Act 2003. See EB [2006] EWCA Crim 2945, [2007] 1 Cr App R 29.
60. R v Wilson [1984] AC 242 (HOL).
61. Ibid 260.
62. R v Ireland and Burstow [1998] AC 147 (CA).
63. R v Dica (n 57).
64. R v Clarence (1888) 22 QBD 23 (CA).
65. R v Dica (n 57).
66. In line with the standard criminal law approach to intention this requires that D intended harm or that they foresaw that harm
was virtually certain to occur because of their action. See Wollin [1999] AC 82 (HOL).
67. R v Savage; R v Parmenter [1992] 1 AC 699 (CA).
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Confusions Between Consent, Violence and Sexuality
As can be seen from this overview of the relevant criminal law, the absence of consent is not a part of the
offence of GBH. Despite this, both Dica68 and Konzani69—the leading cases on the transmission of HIV—
focused on consent as a central issue. In the context of non-fatal OAP, such as GBH, consent is regarded as a
defence instead of its absence being a core part of the offence. However, consent is available as a defence only
within a limited number of categories of accepted and lawful activity.70 Thus, in almost every case where an
HIV positive person (who knows their status) engages in bareback sex, in circumstances where they do
transmit the virus, there is a prima facie offence. By contrast, placing the absence of consent as a central
aspect of the offence, the Sexual Offences Act 2003 has more carefully avoided criminalising consensual
sexual activities.
Indeed, law’s placement of HIV transmission under OAP represents a disclamation of the sexual dimen-
sions of transmission, constructing the offence as one of causing harm or committing violence.71 This ignores
the fact that most incidents of HIV transmission occur during consensual sex.72 This re-coding of HIV
transmission as a result of interpersonal violence, rather than an outcome of mutually desired interactions,
undermines elements of UK public health messaging and places the burden for preventing HIV transmission
exclusively on positive people.73 Further, criminalisation obscures the ability of the ‘victim’ (as constructed
by law) to consent to such activity.
It should be noted that within his dissenting judgment in R v Brown, Lord Mustill attempted to challenge
the categorisation of any sexual conduct under the OAP Act.74 As his argument suggested, capturing con-
senting sexual activity represented an intrusion of law into what had historically been considered a pre-
eminently private domain, stating that the court should not be swayed by ‘repugnance and moral objec-
tion . . . neither of which are, in my opinion, grounds upon which the court could properly create a new
crime’.75 In other words, the language of criminal law, in its treatment of HIV transmission as an abstracted
form of violence, is a kind of obfuscation. Drawing on legal concepts, and a legal language which was never
intended to be applied to sexual interactions, law thus constructs and moderates complex inequalities and
power dynamics between sexual partners. Through the reframing of HIV transmission as an act of harm,
criminalisation also implicates the positive partner as a ‘vector of disease’.76 In doing so, we argue that the
language of law diminishes the humanity of HIV positive people by re-constituting them as a ‘danger’ or
‘threat’ to (‘innocent’) HIV negative people. Not only does this dichotomous discursive framing perpetuate an
unfair status quo, which fundamentally undermines the internal coherence of law in relation to OAP,77 it also
undermines the efforts of public health campaigns (see below). The problem with such language in this
context is that the transmission of STIs is analysed through the same lens as any other form of harm accruing
because of violent conduct, such as a non-lethal stabbing. Thus, an HIV positive person who has bareback sex
without informing their partner of their status is deemed ‘reckless’, despite the possibility of transmission now
being low or non-existent, as outlined in Part One.
68. R v Dica (n 57).
69. R v Konzani (n 57).
70. R v Brown [1993] UKHL 19, [1994] 1 AC 212.
71. The previous law under R v Clarence had held that consensual sexual intercourse did not constitute a battery and therefore no
liability could arise under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 when consensual sexual intercourse led to a sexual
infection. See R v Clarence (n 64).
72. As established in the previous section where either the positive partner is on effective treatment or the negative partner is on
PrEP, the ‘potential’ nature of transmission is scientifically negligible.
73. Matthew Weait, ‘Knowledge, Autonomy and Consent: R v Konzani’ (2005) Crim LR 763, 765–67.
74. R v Brown (n 70) 256–75.
75. Ibid 274.
76. Peter Davies and Paul Simpson, ‘On Male Prostitution and HIV’ in Peter Aggleton, Peter Davies and Graham Hart (eds),
AIDS: Individual, Cultural and Policy Dimensions (Routledge, London/New York 1990) 117.
77. See, generally, Weait, ‘Criminal Law and the Sexual Transmission’ (n 53).
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The law recognises consent as continuing to function as an effective defence in certain circumstances.
Prior to R v Dica, the longstanding authority of R v Clarence78 held sway. This decision affirmed that
there had been lawful consent to sexual intercourse and, thus, no battery had occurred. As such, the pre-
Dica legal position was that where there had been consent to sexual intercourse, there had also been
consent to any results of that intercourse. In other words, an individual could not be liable for transmit-
ting an STI—regardless of the level of harm this entailed—if there had been valid consent to sexual
intercourse. The question of consent—or the ability of the ‘victim’ to consent to an act amounting to
GBH—is problematised by the decision of the House of Lords in R v Brown.79 In Brown, the court held
that consent to bodily harm of a severity amounting to GBH or actual bodily harm (ABH) is not a
consent recognised by law.80 Rather, consent to the risk of such harm will only be valid in the context of
certain socially accepted activities, or categories of activities, which are themselves lawful. For example,
play fighting81 or surgery.82 Bareback sex is not considered to be among these categories, while sexual
gratification is explicitly outlawed as a category.83
As this suggests, R v Brown has effectively stifled the ability of someone to consent to HIV transmission
itself, meaning that within Dica—in order to leave open a possibility of an effective defence to s 20, where
HIV transmission has occurred and some harm was foreseen—there was a need to distinguish between
transmission itself and the risk of transmission.84 As Judge LJ put it:
These authorities [Brown] demonstrate that violent conduct involving the deliberate and intentional infliction
of bodily harm is and remains unlawful notwithstanding that its purpose is the sexual gratification of one or
both participants. Notwithstanding their sexual overtones, these cases were concerned with violent crime, and
the sexual overtones did not alter the fact that both parties were consenting to the deliberate infliction of
serious harm or bodily injury on one participant by the other. To date, as a matter of public policy, it has not
been thought appropriate for such violent conduct to be excused merely because there is a private consensual
sexual element to it. The same public policy reason would prohibit the deliberate spreading of disease,
including sexual disease.85
This created a context where one is able to consent to the risk of a harm—such as the transmission of HIV—
but not the harm itself.86 As Weait argued, ‘to criminalise the taking of such risks . . . [is] not
only . . . impracticable in enforcement terms, but . . . involve[s] unwarranted intrusion into the pre-eminently
private sphere of adult sexual relations’.87
Further confusing the issue of consent in the context of OAP is the decision of the court in R v Wilson.88 In
Wilson, a man branded his wife with his name, using a heated bread knife. Here, the court held that his wife
had offered valid consent, categorising the activity as bodily adornment. Academics have made much of the
gap between Wilson and Brown, even arguing that the heteronormative standards of the court were at play in
78. R v Clarence (n 64).
79. R v Brown (n 70).
80. Ibid.
81. Jones [1986] 83 Cr App R 375 (CA).
82. R v Brown (n 70) 266 Per Lord Mustill.
83. Ibid.
84. This in itself being objectionable because it leaves the difference between a lengthy prison sentence and an acquittal to the
behaviour of a virus, rather than the behaviour of the defendant.
85. R v Dica (n 57) [46].
86. Of course, to consent to a risk of harm the victim must first be aware of the risk. The result of this is that the law as it stands
requires HIV positive people to disclose their status in order to later rely on a defence of consent. This has been problematised
by Cherkassky. See Lisa Cherkassky, ‘Being Informed: The Complexities of Knowledge, Deception, and Consent When
Transmitting HIV’ (2010) 74(3) J Crim L 242.
87. Matthew Weait, ‘Criminal Law and the Transmission of HIV: R v Dica’ (2005) 68(1) MLR 121, 124.
88. R v Wilson (1996) 2 Cr App R 241 (CA).
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both decisions.89 Indeed, we agree with Weait’s argument that the diverging treatment of Brown and Wilson
demonstrates the extent to which ‘the right to respect for private life in law is contingent on conformity to
established gender roles, traditional relationship types and heterosexual orientation’.90 As this suggests, the
difference between a Wilson scenario and a Brown scenario can lie in the ability of the judge to interpret the
conduct through a normative lens.
Weait has drawn attention to how, ‘in cases of HIV transmission, there appears to be an implicit
assumption that the magnitude of the risk makes no difference. Either a person consents to the risk of
transmission or they do not’.91 Given recent developments in the science of HIV, as described in Part One,
this legal position seems even less justifiable. There is a need for law to recognise that the risk of harm has
been dramatically reduced or even eliminated—where the positive partner is on TasP or the negative partner
is on PrEP—and that even if transmission does occur, ART should be accounted for within the harm
threshold, to the extent that continuing to classify a manageable chronic condition with few long-term
health consequences as ‘grievous’ (meaning ‘very serious’ in lay terms) is flawed. In stating this, we accept
that a broken arm is also treatable. However, a key point of differentiation here is in how the harm is caused.
A broken arm is the immediate result of a direct action by the defendant, so treatment works as treatment. In
the case of HIV acquisition, however, the harm is the result of a virus over time. In most cases, the initial
HIV infection is asymptomatic. Indeed, fast application of treatment (in the form of PEP) can prevent any
demonstrable harm. Therefore, in many cases of transmission, treatment functions as a mode of prevention,
stopping the virus from replicating prior to the onset of harm. In this sense, it can be argued that, with
modern treatment, most cases of HIV transmission do not result in a harm in the traditional sense of the
term, certainly not a harm meeting the threshold of GBH.
Discourses of HIV and LGBT Organisations
Despite the reduced risks and harms surrounding HIV, some activist groups and charities appear to support the
criminalisation of transmission, as part of a trade-off for other benefits.92 This represents an inversion of
traditional priorities, with groups—lesbians, gays, bisexuals and trans people (LGBT)—who have been
discriminated against by the legal system historically now turning to become its beneficiaries, adherents, and
advocates. In doing so, these organisations may simultaneously endorse the law’s victimisation of other
marginalised groups.93 This turn has occurred concurrently with the arrival of a homonormative culture
within mainstream LGBT activism,94 which has seen an increasing number of groups and individuals invested
in methods of punishment95 and rights-based frameworks which operate around a version of negative legal
equality (e.g. marriage and non-discrimination norms). This shift can be explained by examining a phenom-
enon which Adler has termed ‘LGBT equal rights discourse’. Specifically, this discourse is defined as a series
of now familiar narratives around equality and inclusion advocacy which ‘comprises a cluster of constituent
strands that depict, characterise and represent LGBT people’.96 LGBT equal rights discourse has, in recent
years, adopted an increasingly normative thrust, targeting agendas such as marriage equality or tougher
89. See, further, Ben Ramanauskas, ‘BDSM, Body Modification, Transhumanism, and the Limits of Liberalism’ (2020) 40(1) Ec
Aff 85.
90. Matthew Weait, ‘Harm, Consent and the Limits of Privacy’ (2005) 13 Fem LS 97, 98.
91. Weait, ‘Criminal Law and the Transmission of HIV’ (n 87) 121, 125.
92. Dean Spade and Craig Willis, ‘Confronting the Limits of Gay Hate Crimes Activism: A Radical Critique’ (2000) 21 Chicano-
Latino L Rev 38, 38–52; Adler (n 10) 56–57, 105–107.
93. See Sarah Lamble, ‘Queer Necropolitics and the Expanding Carceral State: Interrogating Sexual Investments in Punishment’
(2013) 24(3) Law & Crit 229.
94. Homonormative describes a condition where LGBT constituencies increasingly adopt—rather than oppose normative social and
political frameworks. In particular, it sees a discursive movement which stresses similarities over differences. See, generally, L
Duggan, ‘The New Homonormativity: The Sexual Politics of Neoliberalism’ in Russ Castronovo and Dana Nelson (eds),
Materialising Democracy: Toward a Revitalized Cultural Politics (Duke University Press, Durham 2002) 175–94.
95. Mariana Valverde and Miomir Cirak, ‘Governing Bodies, Creating Gay Spaces: Policing Security Issues in “Gay” Downtown
Toronto’ (2003) 43(1) Brit J Criminol 102.
96. Adler (n 10) 3.
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sentences for those accused of hate crime.97 Often, the framing of arguments by LGBT organisations aligns
with an assimilationist politics which seeks to secure rights and tolerance by accentuating similarities between
homosexual and the heterosexual norms.
The normative thrust of LGBT equal rights discourse can be seen in the push for hate crime legislation. For
example, Lamble has strongly critiqued contemporary LGBT endorsement of the carceral state along these
lines.98 Many of the arguments in favour of carceral responses to hate crime are justified on the basis that it
targets a specific characteristic which marks the individual—and the group to which they ‘belong’—out as
different.99 Therefore, the discursive function of hate crime and anti-discrimination legislation is often to
disclaim differences by arguing that everyone has a right to be treated the same. While these arguments are
well meaning, they can obfuscate the ways in which queer people are different. Among these differences, for
example, are preferences for alternative forms of relationship, interests in alternative lifestyles, and non-
normative sexual desires.
Something often elided in the progress narrative around LGBT rights is a consideration of how discursive
and tactical decisions can be detrimental to those less able—or less willing—to adhere to somatic or beha-
vioural norms. As Adler argues, drawing on Foucault, ‘norm production is a useful mechanism for under-
standing the process by which the western progress narrative of gay rights imposes costs on groups that are out
of step with that narrative’.100 Two such groups include HIV positive people and those who desire bareback
sex.
Although we acknowledge that there can be tactical, short term, incentives for HIV and LGBT organisa-
tions to embrace a normative ‘equal rights discourse’, there is also a contradiction between this approach and
public health outcomes which have also been stated as central concerns of such organisations.101 As Dodds
et al. have argued, ‘criminalisation has a limited capacity to support HIV precautionary behaviour, such as
enabling people to use condoms or disclose their HIV status to a sexual partner, and on balance is likely to
have a negative impact on public health goals’.102 Their research—comprising of a series of focus groups with
HIV service providers—found ‘most participants arguing that allocation of responsibility was not uniform and
that it needed to be understood within specific circumstances that can constrain precautionary behaviour’.103
In uncritically or implicitly defending the criminalisation of HIV transmission, such organisations may
inadvertently be harming the service users they claim to support, by placing responsibility on HIV positive
people themselves. In the next section, we explore different legal, medical, and social definitions of harm,
putting forward a case that HIV transmission is no longer sufficiently harmful to constitute GBH.
Part Three: Conceptualising Harm
Definitions of harm are central to understanding liberal legal systems. Noting the volenti non fit injuria
maxim, Feinberg distinguished between normative and non-normative harms as either ‘wrong’ or a ‘setback
to interests’, arguing that Mill’s Harm Principle captures ‘both the risks it generates for the other person and
the setbacks it causes to that person’s interests either intentionally or negligently’.104 Strictly speaking, no
harm is required for most non-fatal offences against the person. For example, a defendant taking hold of a
victim’s arm when they had made it clear they objected to such contact can constitute a battery.105 However,
97. Ibid 105–107.
98. See Lamble (n 93).
99. See, generally, Spade (n 21) ESP 1–21. See, also, Spade and Willis (n 92).
100. Adler (n 10) 83.
101. See, generally, UNAIDS, ‘Criminal Law, Public Health and HIV Transmission: A Policy Options Paper (UNAIDS 2002)
<https://www.hivlawandpolicy.org/resources/criminal-law-public-health-and-hiv-transmission-policy-options-paper-
unaids> accessed 26 October 2020.
102. Catherine Dodds and others, ‘Keeping Confidence: HIV and the Criminal Law from HIV Service Providers Perspectives’
(2015) 25 Critical Public Health 410, 411.
103. Ibid 417.
104. Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others: The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law (OUP, Oxford/New York 1984) ch 4.
105. Collins v Wilcock [1984] 3 All ER 374 (CA).
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when approaching more serious non-fatal offences against the person, such as GBH, the law has applied
thresholds for harm which must be met, in order for the actus reus of the offence to be made out. In this sense,
the legal definition of harm features as a central aspect of offences such as GBH. This is relevant to our
discussion of HIV transmission because, as argued above, questions must be raised about whether acquiring
the virus meets the level of harm required.
In cases where harm has occurred which does not meet the threshold for GBH, an offence of ABH may be
found to have occurred. The requirements for ABH are similar to those required for GBH,106 except a lower
harm threshold is set; specifically, ‘any hurt or injury calculated to interfere with the health of comfort of
[V]’.107 In this sense, an offence of ABH can be made out with any harm which is not determined to be
‘transient and trifling’.108 As this suggests, the law has traditionally taken the enactment of harm against
another person to be a ‘serious’ matter, with serious criminal sanctions applied to even ‘moderate’ inflictions
of harm.109
The caselaw shows that minor injuries such as bruising can be sufficient to meet the harm threshold for
ABH.110 However, recognising this, prosecutorial discretion is often employed so that prima facie cases of
ABH rarely come to be criminally charged. As stated by the 2020 Crown Prosecution Service Charging
standards, while it is for prosecutors to decide whether to charge (after considering all the circumstances), it
will also be relevant to consider whether the injuries are ‘serious or less serious’:
Serious injuries include damaged teeth or bones, extensive and severe bruising, cuts that require sutur-
ing . . . the appropriate charge will usually be contrary to section 39 (Battery) where injuries amount to no
more than the following: grazes; scratches; abrasions; minor bruising; swellings; reddening of the skin;
superficial cuts.111
Therefore, while the legal harm threshold for ABH is set relatively low, lesser forms of harm can be charged as
battery or allowed to pass without charge. This is generally in service to matters of practicality and the
effective use of legal resources.
Excluding fatal offences such as murder, GBH and wounding are the most serious offences against the
person recognised under the criminal laws of England and Wales. Following DPP v Smith, the term GBH
simply refers to ‘really serious’ harm.112 However, in recent caselaw, Golding has indicated that this harm
need not be permanent or dangerous to be considered really serious.113 Following Golding, the question of
whether the harm threshold has been met is ultimately a matter for the Jury, applying ‘contemporary social
standards’.114 It is in order to discern these ‘contemporary social standards’ that we turn to medical and
sociological conceptualisations of harm below.
Further insight into the criminal law’s approach to constructing and defining harm can be taken from
Bollom, which outlined that an analysis of harm should be done with an awareness of the particular charac-
teristics of a complainant. Specifically, the court stated:
these injuries on a six foot adult in the fullness of health would be less serious than on, for instance, an elderly
or unwell person . . . in deciding whether injuries are grievous, an assessment has to be made of, amongst
other things, the effect of the harm on the particular individual.115
106. Although, unlike GBH, ABH continues to require a base offence of assault or battery to have been committed before ABH
can be found to have taken place.
107. Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498 (CCA).
108. Ibid.
109. ABH carries a maximum of five years’ imprisonment. See Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s 47.
110. T v DPP [2003] EWHC 266 (Admin).
111. ‘Offences Against the Person, Incorporating the Charging Standard | The Crown Prosecution Service’ Cps.gov.uk (2020)
<https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/offences-against-person-incorporating-charging-standard> accessed 24 June 2020.
112. DPP v Smith [1960] 3 WLR 546 (HOL).
113. Golding [2014] EWCA Crim 889.
114. Ibid.
115. Ibid.
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As with ABH, the 2020 charging standards provide guidance as to when a charge of GBH may be appropriate.
Again, these standards depart from, yet remain intrinsic to, the strict terms of the law. For example, they
inform prosecutors that: ‘Life changing injuries should be charged as GBH . . . significant or sustained medical
treatment . . . may indicate GBH injuries even if a full or relative recovery follows’.116
This could be viewed in terms of a sliding scale of severity, accounting for the form of interaction between,
and characteristics of, the individuals involved. At the lower end of that scale are trifling or minor injuries
such as a graze. If charged as an offence at all, this would be treated as a battery, with the criminalisation
tending to relate more to the conduct of the defendant than the harm caused. More serious harms such as
bruising, which cannot be considered very serious, will generally be treated as attaining the threshold of ABH.
However, it should be recognised that, following the CPS charging standards, harms of this level may not be
charged or appear in court unless they are towards the more severe end of the spectrum, such as a chipped
tooth resulting from the defendant’s actions. Finally, GBH is intended to be reserved for the most serious
forms of harm. However, as argued above, the latest science should raise questions over whether HIV
infection continues to be among these most severe harms. The legal definitions of harm are multiple and
complex, conceivable in terms of an overlapping scale, but—at least in respect of GBH—are ultimately for a
jury to determine.
Following Golding and Bollom, and applying the medical developments described in Part One, we
suggest that the criminal law relating to HIV transmission as a form of harm needs to be reconsidered and
reconceptualised, taking contemporary social standards and the characteristics of victims into account. In
general terms, with the availability of new treatments (which prevent harm accruing), we suggest that cases
of HIV transmission will rarely amount to the level of seriousness required to constitute GBH.
Medical and Mental Harm
Medicine has also provided influential definitions of harm which both inform and exist alongside the criminal
law. From Hippocrates’ principle of ‘first, do no harm’ to modern medicine’s focus on the diagnosis, treatment
and prevention of disease, harm reduction strategies have been important to health practitioners and policy-
makers. However, medically informed perspectives have also been drawn on to critique the criminal justice
system’s emphasis on moralising punishment as a form of disincentive, on issues ranging from drug con-
sumption117 to sex work.118 For example, the World Health Organization opposes the criminalisation of sex
work on the basis of harm reduction, where ‘studies indicate that decriminalising sex work could lead to a 46%
reduction in new HIV infections in sex workers over 10 years’.119 Alongside reducing sexual violence,
reducing HIV transmission is used here synonymously with reducing harm. As Amnesty International further
suggests, social stigma ‘discourages many sex workers from obtaining sexual and reproductive health infor-
mation and services including on HIV/AIDS’.120 Relatedly, drug decriminalisation has been endorsed as a
strategy to reduce rates of addiction, problematic consumption and HIV transmission.121 The harm reduction
approach has also been championed by ‘legal scholars, clinicians, virologists, and epidemiologists, along with
116. ‘Offences Against the Person, Incorporating the Charging Standard’ (n 111).
117. See, further, Fiona Mesham, ‘Drug Safety Testing, Disposals and Dealing in an English Field: Exploring the Operational and
Behavioural Outcomes of the UK’s First Onsite ‘Drug Checking’ Service’ (2019) 67 International Journal of Drug Policy
102.
118. See, further, Teela Sanders and Rosie Campbell, ‘Criminalization, Protection and Rights: Global Tensions in the Governance
of Commercial Sex’ (2014) 14(5) Criminology & Criminal Justice 535.
119. ‘Sex Workers’ World Health Organization (2020) <https://www.who.int/hiv/topics/sex_work/en/> accessed 28 October
2020.
120. ‘Amnesty International Publishes Policy and Research on Protection of Sex Workers’ Rights’ Amnesty.org ( 2016) <https://
www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/05/amnesty-international-publishes-policy-and-research-on-protection-of-sex-work
ers-rights/> accessed 28 October 2020.
121. Paula Vale de Andrade and Ludmila Carapinha, ‘Drug Decriminalisation in Portugal’ (2010) 341 British Medical Journal
c4554.
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civil society and international organisations’ who oppose the criminalisation of HIV.122 Therefore, it is
important to explore how harm is conceptualised by health and medical professionals.
For many, medical experts will be considered the final authority on the harms associated with HIV. It is
doctors and nurses, alongside lab technicians and mental health practitioners, who test and treat people for
HIV. However, the political dimensions of healthcare cannot be easily ignored. For example, the Department
of Health was central to communicating the ‘harms’ and ‘risks’ of the UK’s HIV epidemic to the public.123 In
1987, the ‘Don’t Die of Ignorance’ television broadcasts had a lasting impact on people’s knowledge of HIV/
AIDS, with John Hurt’s dystopian voiceover announcing: ‘There is now a danger, which has become a threat
to us all. It is a deadly disease and there is no known cure’. This campaign also raised awareness through a
leaflet sent to almost every household:
AIDS is caused by a virus. This can attack the body’s defence system which normally helps fight off diseases
and infections. And if this happens people then develop AIDS—the disease itself. They become ill and die
from illnesses they cannot fight off.
The campaign became deeply ingrained in the national consciousness and continues to shape people’s
responses to HIV. In this sense, it may have contributed to the ‘contemporary social standards’ by which
harm falls to be determined in court. Yet there has been no state-funded information campaign to update the
public about new methods of prevention and treatment, as we have described. The Department for Health did
announce that PrEP would become routinely commissioned on the NHS starting in 2020, even if this was
delayed until later this year by the emergence of Covid-19.124 However, queer theorists have highlighted how
information about HIV prevention, both in the 1980s and more recently, have tended to be led by LGBT
people, publications, and venues, without the assistance of state bodies.125
Another dimension of harm which has been given greater political attention over recent years is mental
health, with successive governments pledging ‘parity of esteem between mental and physical health ser-
vices’.126 This was enshrined in law by the Health and Social Care Act 2012, following publication of the
Government’s No Health without Mental Health report. Around this time, the British Psychological Society,
British HIV Association and Medical Foundation for AIDS & Sexual Health published a report which noted
that ‘despite significant medical advances in HIV treatment, people living with HIV experience significantly
higher rates of psychological difficulties than the general population’, including anxiety, depression, and post-
traumatic stress disorder.127 It further noted an ‘array of concerns about quality of daily life and other
personal, social and medical issues, with widespread reports of discrimination and social isolation’ which
can have a detrimental effect on overall health and wellbeing. Highlighting how criminalisation can exacer-
bate harm, Ramanauskas has further argued, in the context of BDSM:
If a person were to sustain an injury which required medical treatment, they might be reluctant to seek
medical assistance. This is because they might be worried about the legal implications for themselves or their
122. Matthew Weait, ‘Limit Cases: How and Why We Can and Should Decriminalise HIV Transmission, Exposure, and Non-
Disclosure’ (2019) 27(4) Med L Rev 576, 578.
123. Sharif Mowlabocus, Gaydar Culture: Gay Men, Technology and Embodiment in the Digital Age (Routledge, Abingdon
2016).
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www.pharmaceutical-journal.com/news-and-analysis/news/prep-to-be-phased-into-routine-commissioning-during-2020/
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125. Mowlabocus (n 123); Rubin (n 27) 236–40.
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partner. Moreover, given the stigma attached to criminal activities, there might again be a reluctance on the
part of patients to be open with their doctor about the nature of their injuries.128
Relatedly, someone showing the symptoms of seroconversion may fear consequences for their partner under
the law if they were to seek medical assistance. Reviews of the international literature in psychology suggest
that people living with HIV experience elevated rates of anxiety, depression, and suicidality, due in part to the
social stigma which criminalisation fuels.129
Stigma is one of the main reasons for health inequalities between HIV negative and positive people
identified by the research literature. In a survey of 1,777 people living with HIV in the UK, Weatherburn
et al. found that the most common problem experienced by respondents in the past year was ‘anxiety and
depression’ (72%), followed closely by ‘self-confidence’ (71%), ‘sleep’ (70%) and ‘sex’ (68%), where ‘HIV
stigma and discrimination were also common causes of problems, as were difficulties with status disclosure,
which led to isolation, loneliness and fear of never finding someone to love’.130 Respondents’ identified that
the ‘sources of such problems were often neighbours, work colleagues and those in wider social networks.
Comments were variously rooted in homophobia, racism and HIV-related stigma’.131 The role of the criminal
justice system in contributing to social exclusion has also been noted, where structural stigma is ‘problematic
because it often intersects with structural homophobia and racism’.132 Interviewing HIV service providers,
Dodds et al. found that ‘no one, when directly asked what they thought prosecutions accomplished in public
health terms, was able to describe a beneficial public health outcome’. This brings us back to a central
question of this article: what is the purpose of criminalising the transmission of HIV? If the answer is to
protect public health, in the opinion of those working with HIV positive people directly, it is failing.
Because pandemics are necessarily social phenomena, they cannot be adequately prevented or understood
at an individual level, a fact which demonstrates the criminal law’s limitations in helping to control or make
sense of public health matters. The focus of liberal legal systems on rational, choice-making at the individual-
level will always be found wanting when the harms under consideration operate at a population-level. Indeed,
the feasibility of attributing individual blame may be another reason that the transmission of HIV has been
criminalised while coronavirus has not been. Therefore, a public health approach to HIV transmission is at
odds with the punitive approach adopted by current law. The result of these two approaches being contra-
dictory is that the law fails to prevent the harms it claims to address and that it compounds stigma, resulting in
more harm to the health of HIV positive people.
Social Harm and Stigma
The study of social harms—zemiology—proposes that the individualism of criminal law is flawed as it cannot
accurately account for, or fairly respond to, collective wrongdoing (e.g. corporate crimes). Drawing on
postmodern and social constructivist ideas, zemiology has been championed by critical criminologists seeking
to deconstruct performative categories such as ‘criminal’. This label is performative in the sense that it has no
ontological basis beyond the lawmakers who communicate it to regulate, and thus construct, specific beha-
viours and identities. In short, the label ‘criminal’ can be applied to any act or person associated with a
‘crime’.133 The labelling of HIV transmission as a crime can therefore be complicated through a social harm
perspective, which can also be used to highlight how the criminal justice system might itself perpetuate ‘more
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damaging and pervasive forms of harm’.134 Queer theory similarly observes that labels such as ‘homosexual’,
as constructed by medicine and law, occur within an ever-shifting social landscape.135
Drawing a distinction between personal criminalisation and regulatory criminalisation, Baker notes that
while the criminal law can punish an individual’s ‘culpable choice to bring about bad consequences for
others’, it is unable to punish collective entities (such as corporations or governments) for comparably harmful
consequences, which can be significantly more harmful by qualitative or quantitative measures.136 When
collective entities are held to account by regulatory criminalisation, through the levying of fines or revoking of
licences, it ‘does not censure or blame an individual as opposed to a collective of individuals in a very indirect
way, since it is the fictitious entity’ despite, in both cases, the criminal law being justified on grounds of harm
prevention.137
The social harm approach also allows for a ‘focus upon harms caused by chronic conditions or states of
affairs’ beyond individual actions, including ‘institutionalised racism and homophobia’.138 However, national
governments are unlikely to endorse this conceptual framework as ‘their activities (or inactivities) are likely to
be highlighted as sources of harm’.139 Critical criminologists have further drawn attention to the role of the
criminal law in constructing certain behaviours as ‘harmful’ and people as ‘criminal’, without recognising the
harms such forms of labelling can perpetuate. As Hillyard and Tombs note:
Defining an event as a ‘crime’ either sets in motion, or is the product of, a process of criminalisation. The
state—via the criminal justice system—appropriates the conflict and imposes punishment, of which the
prison sentence is the ultimate option.140
They add that ‘these very processes create wider social harms which may bear little relationship to the
original offence and pain caused’, including social inequality, ostracism, and stigma.141 Alongside physical
harm, a social harm perspective considers economic, emotional, and sexual harms as alternatives to the ‘overly-
individualistic’ approach of traditional law.142 As with medical definitions of harm provided above, zemiology
considers the mental health consequences of stigma, as created by criminalisation. It highlights that ‘crime is not
just a question of who breaks the law, but also about who makes the law’,143 and that this cannot be considered
separate from the wider socio-political context in which laws are made. Focusing on examples such as BDSM
and body modification, Ramanauskas has argued that—rather than rational conceptions of consent or harm
reduction—feelings of disgust have influenced decisions such as Brown and Wilson, to the extent that ‘the law
has had an unacceptably disproportionate impact on marginalised groups in society’,144 including those who use
illicit drugs, sex workers, and people living with HIV, among others.145 A social harm approach moves beyond
the individualism of law and medicine to consider humans as a social being, including the complexity of our
desires and interactions, alongside the mechanisms of power which construct and constrain them.
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Conclusion
Sexual risk, and sex more generally, has long preoccupied legislators and others engaged in debates over
criminal justice.146 The ability of individual citizens to interact sexually with others throws a series of criminal
law concepts, such as consent,147 risk, recklessness, and harm into a kaleidoscope, in which they might be
examined and contested. Yet, our framing of criminal law is often underpinned by transient moral and
normative understandings which reflect the shifting attitudes of society. This is not to say that these concepts
are necessarily understood or integrated into the law itself. Rather, as Brooks has, we draw attention to the fact
that research in the broader field of sexuality ‘suffers from distance from a sexual life’,148 and the challenge
for the criminal law is to understand and take account of the lived experience of sex and risk.
The criminal law, and its focus upon a doctrinal dissection of sex, can lose sight of the human, the erotic,
and the complex performance of bodies and their fluids, which tend to be silenced within legal discourse.149
By understanding these lived experiences, we can re-introduce the human into the criminal law and prompt a
re-evaluation of how the law operates. Key concepts—notably in the area of HIV transmission—relating to
risk and harm need to be understood not merely in historical doctrinal terms, but as elements of people’s
sexual lives in the present moment. As we elaborated in Part One, in this moment, the science has transformed
the meaning of an HIV diagnosis while providing new (and outstandingly effective) tools to prevent
transmission.
Halperin has noted that HIV prevention requires ‘a miracle every day’ and that ‘repetition is where miracle
and history meet, and it is where, if anywhere, safe sex becomes habitual’.150 That repetition has arguably
arrived in the form of PrEP and it has miraculous properties for transforming legal, medical, and social
understandings of risk and sex. Together with TasP, the medical landscape through which risk can be
pharmaceutically controlled is significantly different from that of even just five years ago. The science and
healthcare provision relating to HIV is evolving rapidly. Our understanding of HIV is transformed through a
reappraisal of the significance of medications (ART) which can be used as treatment and/or prevention. While
doctrinal law has failed to appreciate this shift, thus far, broader legal and activist narratives also lag in their
conception of themes including consent and violence.
The effects of PrEP and TasP on social attitudes towards sexuality arguably amount to a sexual revo-
lution. As Gonzalez noted, ‘the new sexual revolution may not appear revolutionary, in the wider public
sphere, but it is slowly changing the queer cultural landscape’.151 This is a cultural and health revolution
that underlines the anachronistic nature of the law relating to HIV transmission. Moreover, by maintaining a
site of historic trauma, the criminal law is serving as a force that prevents a cultural healing that mirrors the
health transformation that we have seen in recent years and, in doing so, sustains discourses of fear and
stigma that are incongruous with contemporary understandings of HIV/AIDS in the sphere of law in
England and Wales. Put simply, the science has changed, but the law has not kept pace.
Hunter has previously observed the paradox that, with partial decriminalisation of homosexuality, there
was also heightened scrutiny and regulation of ‘deviant’ sex.152 This informs the sex that men seek and engage
in, and HIV transmission has been a powerful part of this narrative, amidst a broader context of equal rights
discourse in which a new, normative framework has been applied.153 The positioning of bareback sex as
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‘risky’ or ‘slutty’ situates it as behaviour that can attract stigma154 because—as noted above—of the continued
attitudes perpetuated by doctrinal criminal law towards HIV, and STI transmission more broadly. However, as
Fischel has argued, to resist law is not the same as resisting responsibility,155 and the changed medical
landscape means that resistance to law is arguably the assertion of a new—medically and culturally
informed—responsibility to each other.
In this article, we have attempted to bring critical criminology, cultural theory, and health sociology into
conversation with the criminal law as it pertains to HIV transmission. In contrast to the normative cascade that
dominates discourse relating to the criminalisation of HIV and other STIs, a queering of this narrative that
acknowledges non-monogamous relationships, reframes ‘slutdom’, and understands these relationship
dynamics in a framework that is science-informed and culturally-aware would re-shape the criminal law in
this area. Paradoxically, contemporary law finds itself acting perversely and against its own interests. The use
of criminal law in cases of HIV transmission serves to punish the ‘responsible’ behaviour of testing, treatment,
and openness, while it privileges not knowing your status. As Sedgwick argued, ‘ignorance is as potent and as
multiple a thing there as is knowledge’.156 Yet it is precisely this ignorance, sustained and supported by
stigmatising criminalisation, that serves as the greatest risk for further HIV transmission.
Alongside arguing that HIV transmission does not accrue the necessary harmfulness threshold to constitute
GBH, we have drawn on this perspective to raise questions about whether criminalisation could be considered
an additional harm; one which is unprincipled in legal terms, unnecessary in public health terms, and unjust in
sociological terms. The social harm perspective is also critical of the notion of ‘risk society’ described by
Beck, Giddens, and others, where ‘the control of dangerous populations is now a central concern of the penal
system, and an actuarial criminology has replaced a rehabilitative criminology’.157 The dichotomy between
criminal justice and medical intervention is also open to critique from postmodern or queer theory, which has
drawn attention to the ways in which both legal and medical discourses contribute to the othering, victimising,
and stigmatising of HIV positive people and marginalised others. We are arguably at a point where a re-
appraisal of doctrinal criminal law relating to HIV transmission is not merely overdue but also urgent.
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